No one is going to get rich reading tea leaves to predict the outcome of the
US-backed terrorist invasion of Syria. There are so many confusing events that
it’s difficult to keep track of trends that might indicate which way the war on
Assad (and the majority of Syrians) is going. That’s why few people have
noticed certain positive developments that may indicate that
Obama
is seeking a way out with what is left of America’s honor. Whether this
will lead to a stand down of US efforts at regime change will depend on whether
Obama is willing to risk yet another confrontation with influential neocons who
are still intent on crippling Iranian influence in the region through destabilizing
the Syrian government.
The most recent round of peace talks are not likely to be the sham that
previous ones were. Despite Kerry’s tough talk of a Plan B, the US has dropped
demands that Assad step down as a precondition to a deal. The alternative to a
negotiated resolution,
recently
leaked to the Wall Street Journal, would involve escalating the conflict by
providing more dangerous weapons to the jihadist “rebels.” However, the plan is
most likely being presented as the only credible alternative to capitulation to
Russian demands in Geneva. Knowing how man-portable
air defense systems (Manpads) could be used by the terrorists in the wake of a
collapse of the Syrian government, supplying them to the al Qaeda-affiliated
anti-Assad forces would be lunacy. It would make little sense for Obama to give
in to Saudi demands to do so at this point, when he has resisted the temptation
for five years.
Erdogan may be starting to see the futility of further attempts to take down
Assad. The most recent evidence of this is
a
series of high level Turkish visits to Saudi Arabia and Iran. While Turkey
and Iran have common economic interests and a mutual desire to prevent the
emergence of an independent Kurdish state, it is hard to imagine that they
could make much progress on working together as long as Turkey is pursuing a
foreign policy course that is an existential threat to Iran’s status as a
regional power. There are other compelling reasons for Erdogan to try to make
nice with the Sauds, but it is unlikely that he will be able to thaw relations at
the same time he is negotiating with their nemesis. Unless, that is, they are also
discussing letting go of the goal of toppling Assad.
There are also clues that the Obama administration US efforts are being stepped
up to curb further Saudi aid to terrorist “rebels.” The barrage of criticism
that the Saudis are taking in the US media is unprecedented and most likely
orchestrated. It is also somewhat risky, in that it highlights the cynicism of
US “humanitarian interventions” against targeted dictators while it is allied
with the most brutal, repressive regime in the region. From Biden pointing out
that it is the chief financial sponsor of terrorists in the region to recent critical
reports on the generally politically correct
Frontline
and
60
Minutes to Obama’s announcement that the government is
about
to make a decision after two years on declassifying the 28 pages of a
report said to implicate high level government officials in financing the 9/11
attack, the heat is clearly being turned on these feckless “allies.”
Cynics who charged that this was only a ruse to buy time to regroup for a renewed
attack on Syrian forces seem to be ignoring evidence that the situation has
changed since the earlier attempts to “negotiate” a US-dictated solution in
Geneva. Realists in the Obama administration seem to be serious this time. Kerry
was forced into agreeing to talks by the timely intervention of Russia. He had no real choice. Had the offensive continued unchecked, Assad’s
forces would have routed ISIS and Putin would have been able to dictate terms. This is what forced Kerry to agree to peace
talks despite having to bargain from a weak position.
In addition, Erdogan’s panicked response to the prospect of new peace talks
suggests that he believes that the Americans are looking for resolution. Having
responded to advances by the Russian and Syrian militaries and Kurdish defense
forces by stepping up threats, he doubled down once talks were announced, at
one point
declaring
that an invasion was not off the table although when directly confronted
with Russian accusations, he
denied
any such intent. The Turkish military was reported to be against such an
ill-advised action, but troop buildups along the border had
convinced
many that he was serious.
The Turkish call for invasion was echoed by Saudi Arabia, which offered to take
part in a joint campaign if it was led by the US. This was obviously just bluster. After all, the
threat of invasion was the result of Erdogan’s frustration at US unwillingness
to prioritize defeating Assad or to abandon its alliance with Syrian Kurds in
the fight against ISIS. There was no way that the US was going to support an
invasion that would risk WWIII by targeting both the Kurdish YPG and Assad, backed
by Russia and Iran.
Nonetheless, at this point
many
analysts still assumed that Turkey and Saudi Arabia were merely following
orders from Washington. Others saw Erdogan’s increasingly rash actions as desperate
attempts to salvage the standing of his ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP) amidst an economy in decline at least partly because of Russian sanctions.
Rumor had it that he even had reason to worry about an impending military coup.
Although
the Turkish military denied it and analysts generally dismissed the idea,
had he tried to order his generals to carry out a full-scale invasion in defiance
of US wishes, a coup would have been much more likely.
When the US proceeded to resume peace talks on Syria while Turkey and Saudi
Arabia talked war, it became clear that the actions of the three nations were
not coordinated. Saudi Arabia and Turkey had become isolated on the global
stage. Obama had established that he was
not going to allow the tail to wag the dog, and that he was going to act in
what he considered US interests. There is a reason that Obama is no longer making
Assad’s departure a precondition for negotiations. It would not have changed
anything unless the US had been allowed to pick his successor. The only way
that was going to happen was through direct military force, which
Obama
has clearly been trying to avoid. He was willing to
use
al Qaeda associated “rebels” as proxy fighters as he did in Libya, but the
goal was not so much regime change as destabilizing and ultimately balkanizing
the country, a goal which has largely been achieved. The strategy of dividing a
nation into smaller political entities to weaken it is the essence of the
Oded Yinon
plan for establishing a Greater Israel. The idea was to use this tactic
against any neighboring nation that resisted Israeli hegemony.
It is important to understand this point. Given the incestuous relationship between
Israel and US neocons, it is not surprising to see the Yinon strategy being used
in areas in which the US has chosen to intervene. In Iraq Biden is
renewing
calls for the weak federal system he
first
proposed in 2014. It is an idea that has been partially realized with the
increasingly autonomous status of the KRG, the Iraqi Kurdistan government. The divisions left in the wake of the Libya “debacle”
are another example of the same idea, only much messier. Libya was not
considered a failure by fans of this strategy. They did not care so much about
the chaos they left as about the fact that there was no longer a strong central
government to resist NATO plans for Libya and the region. In fact, in a chilling
prelude to the assault on Syria, NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen enthusiastically
referred to the Libyan experience as “a teaching moment.”
Despite mixed signals from the Obama administration since the cessation of
hostilities for the latest round of peace talks, there is reason to believe
that the President is serious about cutting his losses in Syria. As detailed in
the recent
Atlantic
article by Jeffrey Goldberg, he was never enthusiastic about attacking Syrian
forces directly in the aftermath of the
false
flag sarin attack on Ghouta in 2013. He
dragged
his feet on acting despite his harsh rhetoric, allowing saner voices to be
heard.
In the Atlantic article, Obama
criticized all the major players in the continuing humanitarian crisis in
Syria; the Saudis, Erdogan, Netanyahu and the neocons who wrote the “playbook”
he says he is pressured to follow. Their game plan essentially calls for the
use of US military force against any nation that stands in the way of a global
corporate empire nominally led by America and its allies. The fact that Obama is so open about these politically
incorrect opinions at this point suggests that he may be trying to prepare us
for a shift in official US policy.
The always-doubtful argument that intervention in Syria is motivated by humanitarian
concerns is wearing increasingly thin. Obama regards giving in to
Clinton’s
pressure to attack Libya as the “greatest mistake of (his) presidency.” If Obama wants out, Erdogan has few options
but to go along. The Saudis, increasingly on the defensive in the US propaganda
wars, are no doubt aware that they cannot challenge US will on their own, even
if their neocon allies remain on their side. If Obama tries to push a
diplomatic solution that leaves Assad in power and the “freedom fighting” al
Qaeda types stranded, the still-powerful neocons are sure to push back. If he
fails to act according to his realist principles, a Clinton presidency could be
disastrous because she is still pushing for a no-fly zone, which would require
a direct US assault on Syria’s air defenses.
That’s why this is Obama’s Bay of Pigs moment. He can do the right thing and
try to limit the damage that American imperialists can do on his watch, or he
can submit to the pressure of an out-of-control military industrial complex for
a senseless and entirely avoidable war.